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a b s t r a c t
In this paper, we first introduce the notion of identity-based trapdoor mercurial commit-
ment which enjoys the advantages of both the identity-based trapdoor commitment and
trapdoor mercurial commitment, while using the idea of ‘‘Customized Identity’’. Inher-
ently, an identity-based trapdoor mercurial commitment is an underlying building block
for constructing identity-based (non-interactive) zero-knowledge sets. That is, a prover can
commit to a set S in a way that reveals nothing about S and prove to a verifier, in zero-
knowledge, statements of the form x ∈ S and x ∉ S. Besides, although the (non-interactive)
proof is publicly verifiable, it is also bound to the identity of the prover in a way which is
recognizable to any verifier.
© 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
The notion of a commitment is a fundamental primitive and plays an important role in almost all cryptographic protocols
such as auction, voting, identification, zero-knowledge proof. Intuitively, a commitment scheme can be viewed as the digital
equivalent of a sealed envelope. The sender places amessage in the sealed envelope and gives it to the receiver. On one hand,
no one except the sender could open the envelope to learn the message from the commitment (this is called hiding). On the
other hand, the sender could not change the message any more (this is called binding). However, in many applications one
needs commitment schemes with additional properties besides hiding and binding, such as trapdoor commitments, non-
malleable commitments and mercurial commitments.
Trapdoor commitments (also called chameleon commitments) [3] are a commitment with the so-called ‘‘equivocation’’
property. Roughly speaking, a trapdoor commitment scheme allows anyone with the knowledge of trapdoor to open the
commitment in any desired ways (and thus ‘‘equivocate’’). Naturally, without the trapdoor, equivocation would remain
computationally infeasible.
In Eurocrypt 2005, Chase et al. [11] introduced a variant of commitments calledmercurial commitments. Comparedwith
the traditional commitments, the opening of mercurial commitments is two-tiered. In the soft opening (also called teasing),
it is possible for the sender to come up with a commitment that can be teased to any value of the sender’s choice.1 On the
other hand, it is computationally binding in the hard opening (also called true opening).
Mercurial commitments are somewhat different from trapdoor commitments. Note that trapdoor commitments are
equivocal whenever the sender knows the trapdoor information. However, in mercurial commitments the sender must
decide whether to make the commitment equivocal or binding before forming the commitment. In other words, the sender
must beforehand choose whether to ‘‘soft commit’’ so as to be able to tease to any value but not open at all, or to ‘‘hard
commit’’ so as to be able to tease and to open to only one particular value.
The notion introduced in [11] is actually a trapdoormercurial commitmentwhich satisfies a strong equivocation (namely,
simulatability) property. However, a mercurial commitment scheme without such equivocation property also has some
applications. Therefore, Catalano et al. [12] gave a noticeably simpler definition for a plain mercurial commitment and a
trapdoor mercurial commitment, respectively. Besides, Catalano et al. [13] introduced the notion of trapdoor q-mercurial
commitments, which allows the sender to commit to a sequence of exactly q messages (m1, . . . ,mq), rather than to a
single one, as with standard mercurial commitments. Moreover, an interesting problem left is whether there is an efficient
construction for a trapdoor q-mercurial commitment that allows for openings whose length is independent of q. Very
recently, Libert and Yung [24] introduced a new efficient instantiation of q-mercurial commitments to solve this problem.
A trapdoor mercurial commitment scheme is an important building block for constructing zero-knowledge sets (ZKS).
ZKS, firstly introduced by Micali et al. [25], allow a prover to commit to an arbitrary finite set S in such a way that for
any string x he can non-interactively provide an efficient sound proof of whether x ∈ S or x /∈ S, without revealing any
other knowledge about S (not even for its size). All of the constructions [11,13,25] for ZKS used the Merkle-tree-like based
approach. Informally, to generate a commitment com to the databaseD, the prover views each x ∈ D as an integer numbering
a leaf of a height-l binary tree, and places a commitment to the information v = D(x) into leaf number x. Each internal node
of the tree is generated to contain the commitment to the contents of its two children. Then, com is the value of the root in
the tree.
Related work. Ostrovsky et al. [28] provided constructions for consistent database queries, which allow the prover
to commit to a database, and then provide query answers that are provably consistent with the commitment. Their
constructions can handle queries much more general than just membership queries. Recently, Prabhakaran and Xue [29]
introduced a related notion of statistically hiding sets that requires the hiding property of zero-knowledge sets to be
preserved against unbounded verifiers.
Non-interactive zero-knowledge (NIZK) proof systems, introduced by Blum et al. [5], play a significant role in the theory
of cryptography. NIZK proofs satisfy the property of transferability. That is, if the prover P gives a NIZK proof to the verifier
V , the proof is still convincing when V gives it to the third party V ′. Such a feature has some advantages if one would
like to disseminate proofs as widely as possible. On the other hand, NIZK proofs could not offer any guarantees against
plagiarism since there is no evidence for V ′ to recognize the original prover who actually composed the proof. Only when
the dispute occurs, the original prover provides an evidence (e.g. an interactive proof) to convince the judge. Jakobsson et al.
[22] firstly introduced the notion of designated verifier knowledge proof which has the property of non-transferability.
That is, only the designated verifier can verify the proof and cannot convince any third party. Therefore, the problem of
plagiarism can be easily solved. However, it limits the widespread dissemination of the proof. A seemingly trivial idea to
solve the conflicts between dissemination and plagiarism of NIZK proofs is that, the prover could sign on the proof with his
signing key. However, it must rely on the setting of public-key infrastructure. Obviously, the cost of NIZK proofs is increased
due to the key management problem in the public-key infrastructure. Besides, such a proof could not be constructed in the
common reference string model. On the other hand, when a dishonest verifier received the proof σ and the corresponding
signature Sig(skP , σ ) of the prover, he could generate his signature Sig(skV , σ ) and then convince others. Thus, this idea
cannot provide a full solution to this problem.
1 A tease of a commitment to a valuem is actually a guarantee that the commitment cannot be opened to any value other thanm.
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Katz et al. [23] first introduced the notion of identity-based zero-knowledge, where the proof is not only transferable
but also bound to the identity of original prover. As pointed out by Katz et al. [23], the construction of identity-based zero-
knowledge does not require the public-key infrastructure.
The constructions of ZKS based on mercurial commitments [11,25] are also non-interactive, and thus the dishonest
verifier V could copy the proof and convince a third party V ′. Trivially, V ′ cannot know who actually created the proof.
Our contribution. In this paper, we first introduce the notion of identity-based trapdoor mercurial commitments by
incorporating identity-based trapdoor commitments and trapdoor mercurial commitments, and then use it to present
identity-based zero-knowledge sets.
Intuitively, there seems to be a paradox between identity-based trapdoor commitments and trapdoor mercurial
commitments due to the following observation: Note that in an identity-based trapdoor commitment, the trapdoor SIDP
given to the prover P with identity string IDP may destroy all the binding properties of mercurial commitments. We utilize
the idea of ‘‘Customized Identity’’ [1] to solve this problem. Trivially, we could let the customized identity L = IDP ||IDV ||IDT ,
where IDP , IDV , and IDT denote the identity of the prover, verifier, and time, respectively. Though the trapdoor SIDP is given
to the prover P , the trapdoor SL associated to L, which can be used to construct fake commitment, is not available to anybody
(this is similar to the previous trapdoor mercurial commitment schemes). Another advantage using customized identity is
that one could simultaneously know who the receiver is and when the prover created the proof.
An identity-based trapdoor mercurial commitment scheme mainly has three important applications. Firstly, it is an
underlying build block for constructing identity-based (non-interactive) zero-knowledge sets, which do not rely on public-
key infrastructure either while solve the conflicts between dissemination and plagiarism of ZKS. Secondly, a slight variant
of identity-based trapdoor mercurial commitments (we replace L with IDV in the proposed constructions) can be used to
design non-transferable proofs for ZKS protocols (like non-interactive designated verifier proofs). Obviously, the designated
verifier V can use the trapdoor SIDV to open the commitment in any desired ways and thus produce a simulated proof freely.
Thirdly, identity-based trapdoor mercurial commitments are closely related to multi-trapdoor mercurial commitments.
More precisely, identity-based trapdoor mercurial commitments imply multi-trapdoor mercurial commitments. Multi-
trapdoor mercurial commitments are first (implicitly) introduced by Gennaro and Micali [18] to design independent zero-
knowledge sets (while it seems that the term of ‘‘multi-trapdoor mercurial commitments’’ is given by Libert and Yung in a
very recent paper [24]). The non-adaptive flavor of the binding property of multi-trapdoor mercurial commitments suffices
to achieve the property of independence. However, the binding property of identity-based trapdoormercurial commitments
holds in a stronger sense. Besides, Di Raimondo and Gennaro [16] suggested a solution to turn non-adaptive multi-trapdoor
commitments into adaptively ones using a chameleon hash function. A similar transformation could be used to designmulti-
trapdoor mercurial commitment schemes. However, it seems that it does not work for identity-based trapdoor mercurial
commitments due to the randomness in the chameleon hash. Therefore, identity-based trapdoor mercurial commitments
are a stronger notion than multi-trapdoor mercurial commitments.
There may exist other solutions that can also bind the proof to the prover’s identity in ZKS. For example, it is
generally possible to achieve the goal with ordinary mercurial commitments except when the database is empty. If all
the commitments (including hard and soft commitments) in the whole tree embed the identity IDP and the long-term
public key pkP of the prover, then the proof is indeed bound to the identity IDP (Trivially, also the proof must include
the prover’s signature on the root commitment). Nevertheless, this solution is less efficient than identity-based trapdoor
mercurial commitments since longer strings are committed to at each level of the tree which eventually results in longer
proofs. Besides, this solution clearly failswhen the database is empty since soft commitments can be soft opened to any value
and the adversary could easily replace the prover’s signature on the root commitment by his own. In this sense, identity-
based trapdoor mercurial commitments provide a simple and efficient solution to bind the proof to the prover’s identity in
identity-based ZKS.
Organization. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Some preliminaries are provided in Section 2. The definition and
a concrete construction for identity-based trapdoor mercurial commitments are presented in Section 3. The constructions
for identity-based trapdoor mercurial commitments without random oracles are given in Section 4. The construction for
identity-based zero-knowledge sets is given in Section 5. Finally, concluding remarks will be made in Section 6.
2. Preliminaries
In this section, we first introduce the basic definition and properties of bilinear pairings and gap Diffie–Hellman groups,
Boneh–Boyen signature scheme, and Waters signature scheme. We then introduce the notion of trapdoor commitments,
identity-based trapdoor commitments, and trapdoor mercurial commitments.
2.1. Bilinear pairings and gap Diffie–Hellman groups
LetG1 be a cyclic additive group generated by P , whose order is a prime q, andG2 be a cyclic multiplicative group of the
same order q. Let a and b be elements of Z∗q . A bilinear pairing is a map e : G1 × G1 → G2 with the following properties:
(1) Bilinear: e(aR, bQ ) = e(R,Q )ab for all R,Q ∈ G1 and a, b ∈ Z∗q .
(2) Non-degenerate: There exists R and Q ∈ G1 such that e(R,Q ) ≠ 1.
(3) Computable: There is an efficient algorithm to compute e(R,Q ) for all R,Q ∈ G1.
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In the following we introduce some problems in G1.
• Computational Diffie–Hellman Problem (CDHP): Given P, aP, bP for a, b ∈ Z∗q, to compute abP.• Decisional Diffie–Hellman Problem (DDHP): Given P, aP, bP, cP for a, b, c ∈ Z∗q, to decide whether c ≡ abmod q.
It is proved that the CDHP and DDHP are not equivalent in the group G1 and thus called a gap Diffie–Hellman (GDH)
group. More precisely, we callG a GDH group if the DDHP can be solved in polynomial time but there is no polynomial-time
algorithm to solve the CDHP with non-negligible probability. The examples of such a group can be found in supersingular
elliptic curves or hyperelliptic curves over finite fields. For more details, see [4,6,7,9,20,21,26,27].
2.2. Boneh–Boyen signature scheme
LetG1 be a cyclic additive group generated by P , whose order is a prime q, andG2 be a cyclic multiplicative group of the
same order q. A bilinear pairing is a map e : G1 × G1 → G2. Boneh–Boyen signature scheme [2] consists of the following
algorithms:
• KeyGen: Let k be a security parameter. Pick two random integers x, y ∈ Z∗q , and compute (P1 = xP, P2 = yP). The secret
key is (x, y) and the corresponding public key is (P1, P2).• Sign: Given a secret key (x, y), a messagem ∈ Z∗q , pick a random integer r ∈ Z∗q and compute s = 1m+x+yr P , here 1m+x+yr
is computed modulo q. The signature is (r, s).
• Verify: Given a public key (P1, P2), a messagem ∈ Z∗q , and a signature (r, s), verify whether e(s,mP+P1+ rP2) = e(P, P)
or not. If and only if the equation holds, output 1.
Themost general known security notion of a signature scheme is security against existential forgery on adaptively chosen
message attacks, which was firstly defined by Goldwasser et al. [19] as follows:
Definition 1. A signature schemeΩ = (KeyGen, Sign,Verify) is existentially unforgeable under adaptive chosen message
attacks if for any probabilistic polynomial-time adversaryA there exist no non-negligible probability ϵ such that
Adv(A) = Pr

⟨pk, sk⟩ ← KeyGen(1l);
For i = 1, 2, . . . , k;
mi ← A(pk,m1, σ1, . . . ,mi−1, σi−1), σi ← Sign(sk,mi);
⟨m, σ ⟩ ← A(pk,m1, σ1, . . . ,mk, σk);
m /∈ {m1, . . . ,mk} ∧ Verify(pk,m, σ ) = Accept
 ≥ ϵ.
Boneh–Boyen signature scheme is proved to be secure against existential forgery under chosen message attacks in the
standard model provided that the l-Strong Diffie–Hellman Problem (l-SDHP) is intractable in (G1,G2), where the l-SDHP is
defined as below.
• l-Strong Diffie–Hellman Problem: Given an l+ 1 tuple (P, xP, x2P, . . . , xlP), compute a pair (c, 1c+xP).
2.3. Waters signature scheme
LetG1 be a cyclic additive group generated by P1, whose order is a prime q, andG2 be a cyclic multiplicative group of the
same order q. A bilinear pairing is a map e : G1×G1 → G2. Let H : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}n be a collision-resistant hash function.
Waters signature scheme [30] consists of the following algorithms:
• KeyGen: Let k be a security parameter. Pick a random integer y ∈ Z∗q and set P2 = yP1. Choose a random element Q ∈ G1.
Additionally, choose n + 1 random elements Ui ∈ G1, 0 ≤ i ≤ n. Set U˜M = U0∏bj=1 Uj, where bj denotes the j-bit of
H(M). The secret key is yQ and the corresponding public key is Ppub = (P1, P2,Q ,U0,U1, . . . ,Un).• Sign: Given a secret key yQ , an n-bit message m, pick a random integer r ∈ Z∗q and compute the signature Sm =
(yQ + rU˜m, rP1).• Verify: Given a public key Ppub, an n-bit message m, and a signature Sm = (S1, S2), verify whether e(P2,Q ) =
e(S1, P1)e(S2, U˜m)−1 or not. If and only if the equation holds, output 1.
Waters signature scheme is proved to be secure against existential forgery under chosenmessage attacks in the standard
model provided that the Computational Diffie–Hellman Problem (CDHP) is intractable in G1.
2.4. Trapdoor commitments
Definition 2 (Trapdoor Commitments [12]). A non-interactive trapdoor commitment scheme consists of the following
algorithms:
• KG: A probabilistic polynomial-time key generation algorithm that on input 1k, outputs a pair (pk, sk) where pk is the
public key and sk is called the trapdoor (or secret key).
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• Com: A probabilistic polynomial-time commitment algorithm that on input pk, a message m ∈ M, and a random string
r ∈ {0, 1}k, outputs c = Compk(m; r).
• Open: A deterministic polynomial-time opening algorithm that on input the commitment c = Compk(m; r), outputs a
decommitment value d = Openpk(c) as the opening of c. Note that this algorithm is supposed to be run using the same
value r as the Com algorithm.
• Ver: A deterministic polynomial-time verification algorithm that on input pk, c and d, outputs a bit b ∈ {0, 1}. We require
that for allm ∈M, Verpk(Compk(m; r),m, d) = 1 holds with all but negligible probability.
• Fake: A probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm that on input sk, and a random string r ∈ {0, 1}k, outputs a ‘‘fake’’
commitment c = Fakesk(; r), initially not associated to any messagem.
• Equiv: A deterministic polynomial-time algorithm that on input pk, sk, c = Fakesk(; r), and any given message m ∈ M,
outputs a ‘‘fake’’ decommitment d = Equivsk(m; r) such that Verpk(c,m, d) = 1 holds with all but negligible probability.
Note that this algorithm is supposed to be run using the same value r as the Fake algorithm.
A trapdoor commitment scheme satisfies the following properties:
• Binding: There is no probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm A that on input pk outputs, with a non-negligible
probability, c,m1,m2, d1, d2 such thatm1 ≠ m2 and Verpk(c,m1, d1) = Verpk(c,m2, d2) = 1.
• Hiding: The distribution of Compk(m1; r) and Compk(m2; r) are computationally indistinguishable over r . That is, the
commitment Compk(m; r) reveals no information aboutm.
• Equivocation: For any chosen message m ∈ M, a true commitment triple (m, c = Compk(m; r), d = Openpk(c)) is
computationally indistinguishable (over r) from the fake triple (m, c ′ = Fakesk(; r), d′ = Equivsk(m; r)) even if the
distinguisher knows the trapdoor sk.
Remark 1. As noted in [12], all commitments Compk(m) are indistinguishable from a single distribution Fakesk() even if
the distinguisher knows the trapdoor sk. That is, the equivocation property easily implies the hiding property of trapdoor
commitments. Therefore, binding and equivocation are enough to argue the security of trapdoor commitment schemes.
Remark 2. Gennaro [17] gave a slightly different definition for trapdoor commitments. The Fake algorithm is omitted and
the Equiv algorithm is defined as follows:
• Equiv: A deterministic polynomial-time algorithm that on input pk, sk, c = Compk(m; r), d = (m, r), and a message
m′ ≠ m, outputs a new decommitment d′ = (m′, r ′) such that c = Compk(m′; r ′).
This definition is efficient but less general. Throughout this paper, we adopt the definition in [12].
2.5. Identity-based trapdoor commitments
Definition 3 (Identity-Based Trapdoor Commitments [10,15]). An identity-based trapdoor commitment scheme consists of
the following algorithms:
• Setup: A probabilistic polynomial-time key generation algorithm that on input 1k, outputs a pair (PK , SK) where PK is
the public key and SK is called the master secret key.
• Extract: A deterministic polynomial-time key generation algorithm that on input ID, SK , outputs a trapdoor SID for
identity ID.
• Com: A probabilistic polynomial-time commitment algorithm that on input PK , ID, a message m ∈ M, and a random
string r ∈ {0, 1}k, outputs c = ComPK ,ID(m; r).
• Open: A deterministic polynomial-time opening algorithm that on input the commitment c = ComPK ,ID(m; r), outputs a
value d = OpenPK ,ID(c) as the opening of c. Note that this algorithm is supposed to be run using the same value r as the
Com algorithm.
• Ver: A deterministic polynomial-time verification algorithm that on input PK , ID, c and d, outputs a bit b ∈ {0, 1}. We
require that for allm ∈M, VerPK ,ID(ComPK ,ID(m; r),m, d) = 1 holds with all but negligible probability.
• Fake: A probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm that on input PK , ID, SID, and a random string r ∈ {0, 1}k, outputs a
‘‘fake’’ commitment c = FakeSID(; r), initially not associated to any messagem.• Equiv: A deterministic polynomial-time algorithm that on input PK , ID, SID, c = FakeSID(; r), and any given message
m ∈ M, outputs a ‘‘fake" decommitment d = EquivSID(m; r) for c . Note that this algorithm is supposed to be run using
the same value r as the Fake algorithm.
The formal security properties of an identity-based trapdoor commitment scheme are presented as follows:
• Binding: Let k be the security parameter. For all non-constant polynomial f (), there is no probabilistic polynomial-time
algorithmA that on input PK and a target identity string ID outputs, with a non-negligible probability, a commitment c ,
and two pairs (m1, d1), (m2, d2) ∈ M × {0, 1}k such that m1 ≠ m2 and VerPK ,ID(c,m1, d1) = VerPK ,ID(c,m2, d2) = 1.
We assume that A makes at most f (k) queries to the Extract algorithm on the adaptively chosen identity strings other
than ID.
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• Equivocation: For any chosen identity string ID and message m ∈ M, a true commitment triple (m, c =
ComPK ,ID(m; r), d = OpenPK ,ID(c)) is computationally indistinguishable (over r) from the fake commitment triple
(m, c ′ = FakeSID(; r), d′ = EquivSID(m; r)) even if the distinguisher knows the trapdoor SID.
Remark 3. The notion of identity-based trapdoor commitments is a slight generalization of the identity-based chameleon
hashes, first introduced in [1]. The double-trapdoor mechanism [17] can be used to construct either an identity-based
chameleon hash scheme or a key-exposure free one, but not both. Other constructions of identity-based chameleon hash
schemes can be found in [14,32].
2.6. Trapdoor mercurial commitments
Definition 4 (Trapdoor Mercurial Commitments [12]). A trapdoor mercurial commitment scheme consists of the following
algorithms:
• TrMCom− Gen: A probabilistic polynomial-time key generation algorithm that on input 1k, outputs a pair (pk, sk)where
pk is the public key and sk is called the trapdoor (or secret key).
• HCom: A probabilistic polynomial-time hard-commitment algorithm that on input pk, a messagem ∈M, and a random
string r ∈ {0, 1}k, outputs c = HCompk(m; r).• HOpen: A deterministic polynomial-time opening algorithm that on input the hard-commitment c = HCompk(m; r),
outputs a decommitment value d = HOpenpk(c) as the opening of c . Note that this algorithm is supposed to be run using
the same value r as the HCom algorithm.
• HVer: A deterministic polynomial-time verification algorithm that on input pk, c and d, outputs a bit b ∈ {0, 1}. We
require that for allm ∈M, HVerpk(Compk(m; r),m, d) = 1 holds with all but negligible probability.
• SCom: A probabilistic polynomial-time soft-commitment algorithm that on input pk and a random string r ∈ {0, 1}k,
outputs c = SCompk(; r).• SOpen: A deterministic polynomial-time opening algorithm that on input a commitment c , a message m, and a flag
F ∈ {H, S}, outputs a decommitment τ . More precisely, τ = SOpen(m; c;H) is supposed to ‘‘correspond’’ to the
hard-commitment c = HCompk(m; r); or τ = SOpen(m; c; S) is supposed to ‘‘correspond’’ to the soft-commitment
c = SCompk(; r).• SVer: A deterministic polynomial-time verification algorithm that on input pk, c and τ , outputs a bit b ∈ {0, 1}. We
require that for all m ∈ M, either SVerpk(HCompk(m; r),m, τ ) = 1 or SVerpk(SCompk(; r),m, τ ) = 1 holds with all but
negligible probability.
• MFake: A probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm that on input pk, sk, and a random string r ∈ {0, 1}k, outputs a ‘‘fake’’
commitment c = MFakesk(; r), initially not associatedwith anymessagem. MFake is somewhat similar in spirit to SCom,
and the main differences between them are that sk is an input of MFake and the output of MFake can be hard opened
using the trapdoor sk.
• HEquiv: A deterministic polynomial-time algorithm that on input pk, sk, c = MFakesk(; r), and any given mes-
sage m ∈ M, outputs a valid-looking hard opening d = HEquivsk(m; c) for c. We require that for all m ∈ M,
HVerpk(MFakesk(; r),m, d) = 1 holds with all but negligible probability.• SEquiv: A deterministic polynomial-time algorithm that on input pk, sk, c = MFakesk(; r), and any given mes-
sage m ∈ M, outputs a valid-looking soft opening τ = SEquivsk(m; c) for c. We require that for all m ∈ M,
SVerpk(MFakesk(; r),m, τ ) = 1 holds with all but negligible probability.
Similarly, a trapdoor mercurial commitment scheme satisfies the following properties:
• Mercurial binding: There is noprobabilistic polynomial-time algorithmA that on input pkoutputs,with a non-negligible
probability, a five-tuple (c,m1,m2, d1, τ2) that satisfym1 ≠ m2 and
HVerpk(c,m1, d1) = 1 ∧ (HVerpk(c,m2, τ2) = 1 ∨ SVerpk(c,m2, τ2) = 1).
• HH equivocation: For any chosen messagem ∈ M, a true commitment triple (m, c = HCompk(m; r), d = HOpenpk(c))
is computationally indistinguishable (over r) from the fake one (m, c ′ = MFakesk(; r), d′ = HEquivsk(m; c ′)) even if the
distinguisher knows the trapdoor sk.
• HS equivocation: For any chosen message m ∈ M, a true commitment triple (m, c = HCompk(m; r), d = SOpenpk
(m; c;H)) is computationally indistinguishable (over r) from the fake one (m, c ′ = MFakesk(; r), d′ = SEquivsk(m; c ′))
even if the distinguisher knows the trapdoor sk.
• SS equivocation: For any chosenmessagem ∈M, a true commitment triple (m, c = SCompk(; r), d = SOpenpk(m; c; S))
is computationally indistinguishable (over r) from the fake one (m, c ′ = MFakesk(; r), d′ = SEquivsk(m; c ′)) even if the
distinguisher knows the trapdoor sk.
Remark 4. In many mercurial commitment schemes, the soft-decommitment τ to a hard-commitment c consist of some
proper part of the hard-decommitment d. These mercurial commitment schemes are called proper.
Remark 5. As already noted in [12], the SH Equivocation does not make sense in the real life. Also, for the so-called proper
trapdoor mercurial commitment, it is trivial that HH equivocation implies HS equivocation, and HS and SS equivocations
easily imply the Mercurial Hiding property.
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3. Identity-based trapdoor mercurial commitments
In this section, we first give the formal definition of identity-based trapdoor mercurial commitments, and then propose
a concrete construction based on the short signature schemes [2,31] in the GDH groups.
3.1. Definitions
Definition 5 (Identity-based Trapdoor Mercurial Commitments). An identity-based trapdoormercurial commitment scheme
consists of the following algorithms:
• Setup: A probabilistic polynomial-time key generation algorithm that on input 1k, outputs a pair (PK , SK) where PK is
the public key and SK is called the master secret key.
• Extract: A deterministic polynomial-time key generation algorithm that on input ID, SK , outputs a trapdoor SID for
identity ID.
• HCom: A probabilistic polynomial-time hard-commitment algorithm that on input PK , a customized identity L =
IDS ||IDR||IDT ,2 a messagem ∈M, and a random string r ∈ {0, 1}k, outputs c = HComPK ,L(m; r).• HOpen: A deterministic polynomial-time opening algorithm that on input the hard-commitment c = HComPK ,L(m; r),
outputs a decommitment value d = HOpenPK ,L(c) as the opening of c . Note that this algorithm is supposed to be run
using the same value r as the HCom algorithm.
• HVer: A deterministic polynomial-time verification algorithm that on input PK , L, c and d, outputs a bit b ∈ {0, 1}. We
require that for allm ∈M, HVerPK ,L(ComPK ,L(m; r),m, d) = 1 holds with all but negligible probability.• SCom: A probabilistic polynomial-time soft-commitment algorithm that on input PK , L, and a random string r ∈ {0, 1}k,
outputs c = SComPK ,L(; r).• SOpen: A deterministic polynomial-time opening algorithm that on input PK , L, a commitment c , a messagem, and a flag
F ∈ {H, S}, outputs a decommitment τ . More precisely, τ = SOpenPK ,L(m; c;H) is supposed to ‘‘correspond’’ to the
hard-commitment c = HComPK ,L(m; r); or τ = SOpenPK ,L(m; c; S) is supposed to ‘‘correspond’’ to the soft-commitment
c = SComPK ,L(; r).• SVer: A deterministic polynomial-time verification algorithm that on input PK , L, c and τ , outputs a bit b ∈ {0, 1}.
We require that for all m ∈ M, either SVerPK ,L(HComPK ,L(m; r),m, SOpenPK ,L(m; c;H)) = 1 or SVerPK ,L(SComPK ,L(; r),
m, SOpenPK ,L(m; c; S)) = 1 holds with all but negligible probability.
• MFake: A probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm that on input PK , SL, and a random string r ∈ {0, 1}k, outputs a ‘‘fake’’
commitment c = MFakeSL(; r), initially not associatedwith anymessagem. MFake is somewhat similar in spirit to SCom,
and the main difference between them is that SL is an input of MFake.• HEquiv: A deterministic polynomial-time algorithm that on input PK , L, SL, c = MFakeSL(; r), and any given message
m ∈ M, outputs a valid-looking hard opening d = HEquivSL(m; c) for c . We require that for all m ∈ M,
HVerPK ,L(MFakeSL(; r),m, d) = 1 holds with all but negligible probability.• SEquiv: A deterministic polynomial-time algorithm that on input PK , L, SL, c = MFakeSL(; r), and any given message
m ∈ M, outputs a valid-looking soft opening τ = SEquivSL(m; c) for c. We require that for all m ∈ M,
SVerPK ,L(MFakeSL(; r),m, τ ) = 1 holds with all but negligible probability.
Similarly, an identity-based trapdoor mercurial commitment scheme satisfies the following properties:
• Mercurial binding: There is no probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm A that on input PK outputs, with a non-
negligible probability, a six-tuple (c, L,m1,m2, d1, τ2) that satisfym1 ≠ m2 and
HVerPK ,L(c,m1, d1) = 1 ∧ (HVerPK ,L(c,m2, τ2) = 1 ∨ SVerPK ,L(c,m2, τ2) = 1).
We assume thatA can make queries to algorithm Extract for the adaptively chosen identity strings IDi and customized
identities Li ≠ L. That is,A can obtain the trapdoors of any identities but L.• HH equivocation: For any chosen message m ∈ M and any customized identity L, a true triple (m, c = HComPK ,L
(m; r), d = HOpenPK ,L(c)) is computationally indistinguishable (over r) from the fake one (m, c ′ = MFakeSL(; r), d′ =
HEquivSL(m; c ′)) even if the distinguisher knows the trapdoor SL.• HS equivocation: For any chosen message m ∈ M and any customized identity L, a true triple (m, c = HComPK ,L
(m; r), d = SOpenPK ,L(m; c;H)) is computationally indistinguishable (over r) from the fake one (m, c ′ = MFakeSL
(; r), d′ = SEquivSL(m; c ′)) even if the distinguisher knows the trapdoor SL.• SS equivocation: For any chosenmessagem ∈M and any customized identity L, a true triple (m, c = SComPK ,L(; r), d =
SOpenPK ,L(m; c; S)) is computationally indistinguishable (over r) from the fake one (m, c ′ = MFakeSL(; r), d′ = SEquivSL
(m; c ′)) even if the distinguisher knows the trapdoor SL.
Remark 6. It is trivial that all of the three kinds of equivocation properties still hold even if the distinguisher knows the
master secret key SK .
2 In the proposedmercurial commitment scheme, L = IDS ||IDR||IDT and IDS , IDR , IDT denote the identity of the sender, receiver, time, respectively.While
in the resulting ZKS, L = IDP ||IDV ||IDT , here IDP , IDV , and IDT denote the identity of the prover, verifier, and time, respectively.
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3.2. A construction in the random oracle model
• Setup: Let k be a security parameter. LetG1 be a GDH group generated by P , whose order is a prime q, andG2 be a cyclic
multiplicative group of the same order q. A bilinear pairing is a map e : G1 × G1 → G2. Let H : {0, 1}∗ → Z∗q be
a collision-resistant hash function. The security analysis will view H as a random oracle [8]. The master secret key is a
random integer y ∈ Z∗q and the corresponding public key is Ppub = yP .
• Extract: On input ID and y, outputs a trapdoor SID = 1H(ID)+yP for an identity string ID.
• HCom: A probabilistic polynomial-time hard-commitment algorithm that on input Ppub, a customized identity L =
IDS ||IDR||IDT , a messagem ∈ Z∗q , a random integer u ∈ Z∗q , and a random element R ∈ G1, outputs the hard-commitment
(c0, c1) = (e(P, P)me(H(L)P + Ppub, R)u, e(H(L)P + Ppub, R)).
We argue that the range of HCom is G22.
• HOpen: The decommitment value d = (m, u, R).
• HVer: On input Ppub, L, (c0, c1) and (m, u, R), outputs 1 if c0 = e(P, P)mcu1 and c1 = e(H(L)P + Ppub, R).
• SCom: On input Ppub, L, and two random integers u, v ∈ Z∗q , outputs the soft-commitment (note that the range of HCom
is G22)
(c0, c1) = (e(P, P)u, e(P, P)v).
• SOpen: If the flag F = H , λ = u; else if F = S, λ = (u−m)/v. Outputs τ = (m, λ).
• SVer: Outputs 1 if c0 = e(P, P)mcλ1 .
• MFake: On input Ppub, SL = 1H(L)+yP , and two random integers u, v ∈ Z∗q , outputs the fake commitment (c0, c1) =
(e(P, P)u, e(P, P)v).
• HEquiv: Outputs d = HEquivSL(m; c0; c1) = (m, (u− m)/v, vSL). Note that we have c0 = e(P, P)u = e(P, P)mc
u−m
v
1 and
c1 = e(P, P)v = e(H(L)P + Ppub, vSL).
• SEquiv: Outputs τ = SEquivSL(m; c0; c1) = (m, (u−m)/v). Note that we have c0 = e(P, P)mc
u−m
v
1 .
3.3. Security analysis
Now we give the formal security proof of our identity-based trapdoor mercurial commitment scheme. The correctness
of the scheme is obvious from the definition. In the following, we only focus on the mercurial binding and HH equivocation
and SS equivocation since our construction is also a proper trapdoor mercurial commitment.
Lemma 1. In the randomoraclemodel, the proposed identity-based trapdoormercurial commitment scheme satisfies the property
of mercurial binding under the assumption that the l-Strong Diffie–Hellman problem in G1 is intractable, where l denotes the
number of queries thatA can at most ask to the Extract oracle.
Proof. Given a random instance (Q , yQ , y2Q , . . . , ylQ ) of l-Strong Diffie–Hellman problem, the aim of algorithm B is to
compute a pair (c, 1c+yQ ) for some c ∈ Z∗q . B randomly chooses l distinct integers µi ∈ Z∗q for i = 1, 2, . . . , l. Let f (z) be
the polynomial f (z) = ∏li=1(z + µi) = ∑li=0 αiz i, where α0, α1, . . . , αl are the coefficients of the polynomial f (z). Define
P =∑li=0 αiyiQ = f (y)Q and Ppub =∑l+1i=1 αi−1yiQ = yf (y)Q = yP .B runs the Setup algorithm of the proposed identity-
based chameleon hash scheme. The resulting system parameters {G1,G2, q, e, P,H, k, Ppub} are given to the probabilistic
polynomial-time adversary A. We denote respectively by qH and l the number of queries that A can at most ask to the H
oracle and Extract oracle, where l < qH . Also, we assume that A queries H(I) and Extract(I) at most once for any string I
(note that I may be an identity string ID or a customized identity string L).
B randomly chooses qH − l distinct integers ηi ∈ Z∗q for i = 1, 2, . . . , qH − l. Let the set S ={µ1, µ2, . . . , µl, η1, η2, . . . , ηqH−l}. For i-th (1 ≤ i ≤ qH) query to H oracle, B chooses a random element ωi ∈ S and
sends the response H(Ii) = ωi toA. Meanwhile, define S be S − {ωi}.
Let fi(z) be the polynomial fi(z) = f (z)z+µi =
∏l
j=1,j≠i(z + µj) =
∑l−1
j=0 βjz j. For j-th (1 ≤ j ≤ l) query to Extract oracle, if
ωj = µi (1 ≤ i ≤ l), B sends SIj =
∑l−1
j=0 βjyjQ = fi(y)Q = 1µi+yP toA as the response. Else if ωj ∈ {η1, η2, . . . , ηqH−l}, B
reports failure and aborts.
Since the proposedmercurial commitment is proper, we only need to consider the soft collisions. That is, ifA, with a non-
negligible probability ε, can find a collision (c0, c1, L,m1,m2, r1, r2, R) such that H(L) = µ ∈ {η1, η2, . . . , ηqH−l},m1 ≠ m2,
c1 = e(H(L)P+Ppub, R), and c0 = e(P, P)m1cr11 = e(P, P)m2cr21 , thenwe can compute SL = 1H(L)+yP = (m1−m2)−1(r2− r1)R.
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Similar to [2], using long division we write the polynomial f as f (z) = γ (z)(z + H(L)) + γ−1 for some polynomial
γ (z) = ∑l−1i=0 γiz i and some γ−1 ∈ Zq. Then we have f (z)z+H(L) = γ (z) + γ−1z+H(L) . Note that H(L) = µ /∈ {µ1, µ2, . . . , µl} and
f (z) =∏li=1(z + µi), thus (z + H(L)) does not divide f (z). Trivially, we have γ−1 ≠ 0. Then B can compute
1
H(L)+ yQ = (γ−1)
−1 γ−1
H(L)+ yQ = (γ−1)
−1

SL −
l−1
i=0
γiyiQ

.
Then (H(L), 1H(L)+yQ ) is the solution to the l-Strong Diffie–Hellman problem. The success of probability of B is ε
′ = 1qH ε if
we let l = qH − 1. 
Lemma 2. The proposed identity-based trapdoor mercurial commitment scheme satisfies the property of HH equivocation.
Proof. Note that for any chosen message m ∈ M and any customized identity L, a true commitment tuple (c =
HComPK ,L(m; r), d = HOpenPK ,L(c)) = (e(P, P)me(H(L)P + Ppub, R)u, e(H(L)P + Ppub, R),m, u, R), while the fake one
(c ′ = MFakeSL(; r), d′ = HEquivSL(m; c ′))= (e(P, P)u, e(P, P)v,m, (u−m)/v, vSL). If u, v are random elements of Z∗q and R
is a randomelement ofG1, thenwe know that c, c ′ are both randomelements ofG22. Similarly, (u−m)/v is a randomelement
of Z∗q , and vSL is a random element of G1. Thus, (c, d) and (c ′, d′) are perfectly indistinguishable even if the distinguisher
knows the trapdoor SL. 
Lemma 3. The proposed identity-based trapdoor mercurial commitment scheme satisfies the property of SS equivocation.
Proof. Note that for any chosen message m ∈ M and any customized identity L, a true commitment tuple (c =
SComPK ,L(; r), d = SOpenPK ,L(m; c; S)) = (e(P, P)u, e(P, P)v,m, (u−m)/v), while the fake tuple (c ′ = MFakePK ,L(; r), d′ =
SEquivPK ,L(m; c ′)) = (e(P, P)u, e(P, P)v,m, (u − m)/v). Trivially, (c, d) and (c ′, d′) are perfectly indistinguishable even if
the distinguisher knows the trapdoor SL. 
With Lemmas 1–3, we have the following theorem:
Theorem 1. In the random oracle model, the proposed construction is a secure identity-based trapdoor mercurial commitment
scheme under the assumption that the l-Strong Diffie–Hellman problem in G1 is intractable.
4. Constructions without random oracles
In this section,we present two constructions for identity-based trapdoormercurial commitment schemes in the standard
model.
4.1. Construction based on Boneh–Boyen full secure signature scheme
• Setup: Let k be a security parameter. LetG1 be a GDH group generated by P , whose order is a prime q, andG2 be a cyclic
multiplicative group of the same order q. A bilinear pairing is a map e : G1 × G1 → G2. Let H : {0, 1}∗ → Z∗q be a
full-domain collision-resistant hash function. Pick two random integers y1, y2 ∈ Z∗q . The master secret key is (y1, y2) and
the corresponding public key is (Ppub1 = y1P, Ppub2 = y2P).
• Extract: On input ID, y1, y2, and a random integer w ∈ Z∗q , outputs a trapdoor SID = (w, 1H(ID)+y1+wy2 P) for an identity
string ID.
• HCom: A probabilistic polynomial-time hard-commitment algorithm that on input Ppub1, Ppub2, a customized identity
L = IDS ||IDR||IDT , a message m ∈ Z∗q , a random element R ∈ G1, and two random elements u, w ∈ Z∗q , outputs the
hard-commitment (c0, c1), here
c0 = e(P, P)me(H(L)P + Ppub1 + wPpub2, R)u, c1 = e(H(L)P + Ppub1 + wPpub2, R).
We argue that the range of HCom is G22.• HOpen: The decommitment value d = (m, u, w, R).
• HVer: On input Ppub1, Ppub2, L, (c0, c1) and (m, u, w, R), outputs 1 if c0 = e(P, P)mcu1 and c1 = e(H(L)P+Ppub1+wPpub2, R).• SCom: On input Ppub1, Ppub2, L, and two random integers u, v ∈ Z∗q , outputs the soft-commitment (note that the range of
HCom is G22)
(c0, c1) = (e(P, P)u, e(P, P)v).
• SOpen: If the flag F = H , λ = u; else if F = S, λ = (u−m)/v. Outputs τ = (m, λ).
• SVer: Outputs 1 if c0 = e(P, P)mcλ1 .
• MFake: On input Ppub1, Ppub2, SL = (w, 1H(L)+y1+wy2 P), and two random integers u, v ∈ Z∗q , outputs the fake commitment
(c0, c1) = (e(P, P)u, e(P, P)v).
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• HEquiv: Outputs d = HEquivSL(m; c0; c1) = (m, (u − m)/v,w, v 1H(L)+y1+wy2 P). Note that we have c0 = e(P, P)u =
e(P, P)mc
u−m
v
1 and c1 = e(P, P)v = e(H(L)P + Ppub1 + wPpub2, v 1H(L)+y1+wy2 P).
• SEquiv: Outputs τ = SEquivSL(m; c0; c1) = (m, (u−m)/v). Note that we have c0 = e(P, P)mc
u−m
v
1 .
Security arguments. The proposed construction is a secure identity-based trapdoor mercurial commitment as long as
the Boneh–Boyen full signature scheme is secure. We only focus on the mercurial binding since the properties of both
HH and SS equivocation are straightforward. Also, since the proposed mercurial commitment is proper, we just need
to consider the soft collisions. That is, if an adversary, with a non-negligible probability ε, can find a soft collision
(c0, c1, L,m1,m2, u1, u2, w1, R1) such that m1 ≠ m2, c0 = e(P, P)m1cu11 = e(P, P)m2cu21 , and c1 = e(H(L)P + Ppub1 +
w1Ppub2, R1), then we can compute 1H(L)+y1+w1y2 P = (m1−m2)−1(u2− u1)R1. That is, we could obtain a valid Boneh–Boyen
full signature SL = (w1, 1H(L)+y1+w1y2 P) on message H(L). However, Boneh–Boyen full signature scheme [2] is existentially
unforgeable against adaptive chosen message attacks in the standard model, provided that the Strong Diffie–Hellman
assumption holds in (G1,G2). Therefore, the proposed scheme satisfies the property of mercurial binding.
4.2. Construction based on waters signature scheme
• Setup: Let k be a security parameter. LetG1 be a GDH group generated by P1, whose order is a prime q, andG2 be a cyclic
multiplicative group of the same order q. A bilinear pairing is a map e : G1 × G1 → G2. Let H : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}n be
a collision-resistant hash function. Pick a random integer y ∈ Z∗q and set P2 = yP1. Choose a random element Q ∈ G1.
Additionally, choose n + 1 random elements Ui ∈ G1, 0 ≤ i ≤ n. Set U˜M = U0∏bj=1 Uj, where bj denotes the j-bit of
H(M). The master secret key is yQ and the corresponding public key is Ppub = (P1, P2,Q ,U0,U1, . . . ,Un).
• Extract: On input ID, yQ , and a random integer r ∈ Z∗q , outputs a trapdoor SID = (yQ + rU˜ID, rP1) for an identity string
ID.
• HCom: A probabilistic polynomial-time hard-commitment algorithm that on input Ppub, a customized identity L =
IDS ||IDR||IDT , a message m ∈ Z∗q , three random elements u, d1, d2 ∈ Z∗q , and two random elements S1, S2 ∈ G1, outputs
the hard-commitment (S1, S2, c0, c1), here
c0 = e(Q , P2)m(e(S1, P1)d1e(S2, U˜−1L )d2)u, c1 = e(S1, P1)d1e(S2, U˜−1L )d2 .
Note that U˜−1L denotes the inverse element of U˜L in G1. We argue that the range of HCom is G
2
1 × G22.
• HOpen: The decommitment value d = (m, u, d1, d2).
• HVer: On input Ppub, L, (S1, S2, c0, c1) and (m, u, d1, d2), outputs 1 if c0 = e(Q , P2)mcu1 and c1 = e(S1, P1)d1e(S2, U˜−1L )d2 .
• SCom: On input Ppub, L, two random integers u, v ∈ Z∗q , and two random elements S1, S2 ∈ G1, outputs the soft-
commitment (note that the range of HCom is G21 × G22)
(S1, S2, c0, c1) = (S1, S2, e(Q , P2)u, e(Q , P2)v).
• SOpen: If the flag F = H , λ = u; else if F = S, λ = (u−m)/v. Outputs τ = (m, λ).
• SVer: Outputs 1 if c0 = e(Q , P2)mcλ1 .
• MFake: On input Ppub, SL = (yQ + rU˜L, rP1), and four random integers d1, d2, u, v ∈ Z∗q , outputs the fake commitment
(S1, S2, c0, c1) = (d−11 v(yQ + rU˜L), d−12 vrP1, e(Q , P2)u, e(Q , P2)v).
• HEquiv: Outputs d = HEquivSL(m; S1; S2; c0; c1) = (m, (u − m)/v, d1, d2). Note that we have c0 = e(Q , P2)u =
e(Q , P2)mc
u−m
v
1 and c1 = e(Q , P2)v = e(S1, P1)d1e(S2, U˜−1L )d2 .
• SEquiv: Outputs τ = SEquivSL(m; c0; c1) = (m, (u−m)/v). Note that we have c0 = e(P, P)mc
u−m
v
1 .
Security arguments. The proposed construction is a secure identity-based trapdoor mercurial commitment as long as
the Waters signature scheme is secure. Similarly, we only focus on the mercurial binding. Since the proposed mercurial
commitment is proper, we only need to consider the soft collisions. That is, if an adversary, with a non-negligible probability
ε, can find a soft collision (S1, S2, c0, c1, L,m,m′, u, u′, d1, d2) such that m ≠ m′, c0 = e(Q , P2)mcu1 = e(Q , P2)m′cu′1 ,
c1 = e(S1, P1)d1e(S2, U˜−1L )d2 , thenwe can compute SL = ((m−m′)−1(u′−u)d1S1, (m−m′)−1(u′−u)d2S2). That is, we could
obtain a validWaters signature SL onmessage L. However,Waters signature scheme [30] is existentially unforgeable against
adaptive chosenmessage attacks in the standardmodel, provided that the computational Diffie–Hellman assumption holds.
Therefore, the proposed scheme satisfies the property of mercurial binding.
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5. Identity-based zero-knowledge sets
A database is a map {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}∗∪{⊥} such that D(x) ≠ ⊥ for only finitely many values x. The domain of D is called
keys and the range is called values. We will say that x ∈ D if D(x) ≠ ⊥.
Informally, a ZKS scheme [25] consists of three polynomial-time algorithms ZKS-Setup, P (the Prover), andV (the Verifier)
satisfying the following properties:
• Completeness: For all database D and for all x such that D(x) = v (where v can be a value if x ∈ D or ⊥ otherwise) an
honest P who correctly commits to D can always convince V that D(x) = v.
• Soundness: Once a commitment to the database D has been formed, no probabilistic polynomial-time malicious P ′ can,
for the same x, convince V that D(x) = v1 and D(x) = v2 for v1 ≠ v2.• Zero-knowledge: There exists a simulator S such that even for adversarially chosen D, no adversarial V can tell whether
he is (a) talking to an honest P committed to D, or (b) talking to S who only has an oracle access to D.
Chase et al. [11] gave a formal definition of ZKS as below:
Definition 6. A ZKS consists of the probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms ZKS-Setup, P = (P1, P2), and V satisfying the
following properties:
• Completeness: For all database D and for all x,
Pr[σ ← ZKS-Setup(1k); (com, state)← P1(1k, σ ,D);πx ← P2(state, x) :
V (1k, σ , com, x,D(x), πx) = T] = 1.
• Soundness: For all x and for all probabilistic polynomial-time malicious provers P ′,
Pr[σ ← ZKS-Setup(1k); (com, v1, v2, π1, π2)← P ′(1k, σ ) :
v1 ≠ v2 ∧ V (1k, σ , com, x, v1, π1) = T ∧ V (1k, σ , com, x, v2, π2) = T]
is negligible in k.
• Zero-knowledge: There exists a simulator Sim such that for any probabilistic polynomial-timemalicious verifier Adv, the
absolute value of the difference
Pr[σ ← ZKS-Setup(1k); (D, stateA)← Adv(1k, σ );
(com, stateP)← P1(1k, σ ,D) : AdvP2(stateP ,·)(stateA) = 1]
− Pr[(σ , stateS)← Sim(1k); (D, stateA)← Adv(1k, σ );
(com, stateS)← Sim(1k, stateS) : AdvSim(stateS ,·,D(·))(stateA) = 1]
is negligible in k. Note that the notation AdvSim(stateS ,·,D(·)) means that the adversary gets to choose x and will receive the
result of Sim(stateS, x,D(x)).
An identity-based NIZK proof system [23] not only satisfies the properties of completeness, soundness and zero-
knowledge of standard NIZK proof systems, but also satisfies the so-called property of ‘‘extractable identities’’: given a proof
with an identity string ID as one of its inputs, V outputs a bit denoting acceptance/rejection of the proof as well as an identity
string ID indicating which party it believes was the one who generated the proof. Besides, we should consider the security
against adaptively chosen identity attacks in identity-based NIZK proof systems. Informally, it is impossible for an adversary
to claim any proof with respect to a new identity unless the adversary could have proved such a statement on its own. More
specifically, anything that the adversary can prove with respect to a new identity ID after seeing polynomial number of
proofs σi given by the prover with multiple identities IDi (1 ≤ i ≤ k) adaptively chosen by the adversary, could have been
proved by the adversary without seeing these proofs [23].
In the following, we present the formal definition of identity-based ZKS.
Definition 7. An identity-based ZKS consists of the probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms IDZKS-Setup, P = (P1, P2),
and V satisfying the following properties:
• Completeness: For all database D, all customized identity L, and for all x,
Pr[σ ← IDZKS-Setup(1k); (com, state)← P1(1k, σ , L,D);πx ← P2(state, x) :
V (1k, σ , L, com, x,D(x), πx) = T] = 1.
• Soundness: For all x, all L, and for all probabilistic polynomial-time malicious provers P ′,
Pr[σ ← IDZKS-Setup(1k); (com, L, v1, v2, π1, π2)← P ′(1k, σ ) :
v1 ≠ v2 ∧ V (1k, σ , L, com, x, v1, π1) = T ∧ V (1k, σ , L, com, x, v2, π2) = T]
is negligible in k.
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• Zero-knowledge: There exists a simulator Sim such that for any probabilistic polynomial-timemalicious verifier Adv, the
absolute value of the difference
Pr[σ ← IDZKS-Setup(1k); (D, stateA)← Adv(1k, σ );
(com, stateP)← P1(1k, σ , L,D) : AdvP2(stateP ,·)(stateA) = 1]
− Pr[(σ , stateS)← Sim(1k); (D, stateA)← Adv(1k, σ );
(com, stateS)← Sim(1k, L, stateS) : AdvSim(stateS ,·,D(·))(stateA) = 1]
is negligible in k. Note that the notation AdvSim(stateS ,·,D(·)) means that the adversary gets to choose x and will receive the
result of Sim(stateS, x,D(x)).
• Extractable identities: For all database D, all customized identity L, and for all x,
Pr[σ ← IDZKS-Setup(1k); (com, state)← P1(1k, σ , L,D);πx ← P2(state, x) :
V (1k, σ , L, com, x,D(x), πx) = L] = 1.
In other words, the output of V consists of two components: one is T for completeness, and the other is L for extractable
identities.
• Security against adaptively chosen identity attacks: For all database D, all x, and for any probabilistic polynomial-time
malicious verifier Adv, the absolute value of the difference Pr1Adv(k)− Pr2Adv(k) is negligible in k, where
Pr1Adv(k) = Pr[σ ← IDZKS-Setup(1k); Li ← Adv(1k, σ );
(comi, statei)← P1(1k, σ , Li,D);π (i)x ← P2(statei, x);
V (1k, σ , Li, comi, x,D(x), π (i)x ) = T :
Adv(1k, σ , Li, comi, x,D(x), π (i)x ) = (L, com, πx) ∧ L ≠ Li
∧ V (1k, σ , L, com, x,D(x), πx) = T],
Pr2Adv(k) = Pr[σ ← IDZKS-Setup(1k); Li ← Adv(1k, σ ) :
Adv(1k, σ , Li, x,D(x)) = (L, com, πx) ∧ L ≠ Li
∧ V (1k, σ , L, com, x,D(x), πx) = T],
denote the probability that Adv outputs a valid proof (com, πx) with respect to a new customized identity L ≠ Li in the
real game and simulated game respectively, and Li is a list of customized identities queried by Adv.
Now,wepresent a construction of identity-based ZKSusing an identity-based trapdoormercurial commitmentID-MCom,
a collision-resistant hash function H that maps an ordered pair of commitment into the domain of the database D, and an
identity-based signature scheme Sign against existential forgery on adaptively chosen message and ID attacks such as [9].
The detailed construction of identity-based ZKS is almost the same as the one for ZKS in [11]. The difference is that
identity-based ZKS use ID-MCom as a building block. Moreover, in the phase of committing to D, we not only generate the
commitment com to D, but also compute a signature Sig = SignSID(com, L) on the commitment com and the customized
identity L using the identity-based signature scheme Sign. This prevents the dishonest prover from constructing a proof
which uses some arbitrary identity, as opposed to the own identity of the prover. As noted in [23], this cannot be prevented
without the additional assumption of some infrastructurewho binds the physical entities to identities. Due to the advantage
of identity-based systems, the proposed construction does not rely on public-key infrastructure. Inherently, in the phase of
verifying the answers, the verifier also checks that the signature Sig is valid and ID is the first part of L.
• Committing to the database. To generate the committing com to the database D, the prover generates a height-l binary
tree of commitment as follows: First, choose a pseudorandom function Fs from the family by randomly choosing a seed s
and let ra = Fs(a). For each x such that D(x) = v ≠⊥, compute Cx = HComPK ,L(v; rx); For each x such that D(x) =⊥ but
D(x′) ≠⊥, compute Cx = SComPK ,L(; rx), where x′ denotes xwith the last bit flipped; Define Cx = nil for all other x. Now
build the tree in a bottom-up fashion as follows: for each level i from l− 1 to 0, and for each string σ of length i, define
Cσ as follows:
· Cσ = HComPK ,L(H(Cσ0, Cσ1); rσ ) for all σ such that Cσ0 ≠ nil and Cσ1 ≠ nil.
· Cσ = SComPK ,L(; rσ ) for all σ such that Cσ ′ has been defined in step 1 while Cσ has not been, where σ ′ denotes σ with
the last bit flipped.
· Cσ = nil for all other σ .
If the value at the root Cε = nil (this means that D is empty), redefine Cε = SComPK ,L(; rε). Let com = Cε , and compute
the signature Sig = SignSID(com, L).
• Answering queries. If the query x ∈ D, proceed as follows. Let x|i be the first i bits of x, and (x|i)′ be the first i − 1 bits
of x followed by the i-th bit flipped. Let πx = HOpenPK ,L(Cx) and πx|i = HOpenPK ,L(Cx|i) for 0 ≤ i ≤ l. Returns Sig , D(x)
togetherwith Cx|i , C(x|i)′ for 1 ≤ i ≤ l andπx|i for 0 ≤ i ≤ l. That is, the prover returnsD(x) togetherwith its authenticating
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path to the root, which consists of ancestors of x, their siblings, and proofs that each parent is the commitment to the
two children.
If the query x /∈ D, proceed as follows. IfCx = nil, lethbe the largest value such thatCx|h ≠ nil, letCx = HComPK ,L(⊥; rx)
and build a path from x to Cx|h as follows: let Cx′ = SComPK ,L(; rx′); for each i from l − 1 to h + 1, define Cx|i =
HComPK ,L(H(Cx|i0, Cx|i1); rx|i) and C(x|i)′ = SComPK ,L(; r(x|i)′). Obviously, the only values inside the tree redefined by the
above procedure are those that were nil before. Let τx = SOpenPK ,L(⊥; Cx;H) and τx|i = SOpenPK ,L((Cx|i0, Cx|i1); Cx|i;H)
for 0 ≤ i ≤ l. In other words, the prover returns ⊥ together with its authenticating path to the root, which consists of
ancestors of x, their siblings, and teaser-proofs that each parent is the commitment to the two children.
• Verifying answers. If the answer is not ⊥, the verifier simply performs HVerPK ,L(Cx|i , (Cx|i0, Cx|i1), πx|i) for 1 ≤
i < l, HVerPK ,L(com, (C0, C1), πε) and HVerPK ,L(Cx, v, πx). If the answer is ⊥, the verifier simply performs
SVerPK ,L(Cx|i , (Cx|i0, Cx|i1), τx|i) for 1 ≤ i < l, HVerPK ,L(com, (C0, C1), τε) and SVerPK ,L(Cx,⊥, τx). Moreover, in both cases
the verifier also checks that Sig is a valid signature using the public key ID, which is consistent with L. This ensures that
the prover with ID indeed generates the trees of commitment by himself.
Security. The properties of completeness, soundness and zero-knowledge of the proposed construction are due to the
properties of identity-based trapdoor mercurial commitment scheme (this firstly implies that our construction is a ZKS
scheme).
Firstly, our construction satisfies completeness since the hard-commitment can always be (soft or hard) decommitted to
the values they were committed to, and soft-commitment can always be soft-decommitted to any value.
Secondly, the soundness is due to the binding property of the identity-based trapdoor mercurial commitment scheme.
Actually, suppose that there is a malicious prover can produce two different answers v1 and v2 to the same query x which
is accepted by a verifier, then we consider the following two cases. If v1 ≠⊥ and v2 ≠⊥, then for some commitment on
the path from x to the root, the algorithm Hver returns a decision bit ‘‘1’’ for two different decommitted values. If v1 =⊥
and v2 ≠⊥, or v1 ≠⊥ and v2 =⊥, then for some commitment on the path from x to the root, the algorithms Hver and
Sver return a decision bit ‘‘1’’ for two different decommitted values. Note that in both cases, the same commitment and the
two different decommitted values exist because the root is always the same, but the leaves are different. Thus, either case
contradicts the binding property of the mercurial commitment scheme.
Thirdly, a simulator runs the algorithm Setup to generate a key pair (PK , SK). Note that the knowledge of SK allows the
simulator some extra power that the real prover does not have (e.g., computing the trapdoor SL for any possible customized
identity L). The simulator then uses the algorithm MFake to generate a commitment in the proof of the tree. In response
queries, it will use the algorithm MFake to generate not-yet-generated nodes on the path from the root to the queried leaf,
and use the algorithms HEquiv or SEquiv (depending on whether x ∈ D or not) to decommit nodes on the path to their
children. Due to the properties of HH equivocation and SS equivocation, the real commitment and the corresponding (soft
or hard) decommitment generated by the real prover are indistinguishable from the fake ones generated by the simulator.
Thus, no polynomial-time distinguisher can tell whether he is talking to a real prover or to a simulator.
Moreover, given a valid proof with customized identity L, the verifier V can easily extract the identity IDP (the first part
of L) to verify the validity of the signature Sig . Thus, the property of extractable identities is achieved. Moreover, the verifier
V believe that the proof is generated by the prover P with the identity IDP .
Finally, we focus on the security against adaptively chosen identity attacks. Intuitively, given the answer (or proof πi) on
a value x, V can verify the answers to know the theorem of ‘‘x ∈ D or x /∈ D’’. However, V cannot know any other information
about D. Therefore, even given polynomial number of proofs πi with respect to adaptively chosen identities Li, the adversary
A cannot construct a new proof π ≠ πi with respect to L for the theorem of ‘‘x ∈ D or x /∈ D’’ since he does not know further
information about D (even for the size).3 In the following we present the formal proof.
LetA be any adversary of the real game in Definition 6. We can build an adversaryA′ of the simulated game as follows.
First of all A′ selects the public key σ for the identity-based ZKS and then feeds σ to A. Suppose that A can obtain at
most f (k) proof π for the theorem of ‘‘x ∈ D or x /∈ D’’. A′ computes f (k) fake commitments (com1, com2, . . . , comf (k)).
For 1 ≤ i ≤ f (k), A′ sends comi to A, and runs the algorithm Extract to obtain the trapdoor SLi with respect to the
customized identity Li adaptively chosen byA. Trivially,A′ can (hard or soft) open the commitment comi (together with all
the commitments in the authentication path from the leaf D(x) to the root comi) in any desired ways with the knowledge of
SLi . Therefore,A
′ can compute a simulated proof π (i)x such that V (1k, σ , Li, comi, x,D(x), π (i)x ) = T. Finally,A output a triple
(L, com, πx). If and only if L ≠ Li and V (1k, σ , L, com, x,D(x), πx) = T,A′ outputs (L, com, πx). Moreover, since the identity-
based trapdoor mercurial commitment in the identity-based ZKS satisfies the properties of both HH and SS equivocation,
we can deduce that the absolute value of the difference Pr1Adv(k) − Pr2Adv(k) is negligible in k. More specifically, if the
distribution between a true triple (m, c, d) and a fake one (m, c ′, d′) for the HH and SS equivocation is indistinguishable in
a perfect sense (not just computational sense as in Definition 4), then we even have Pr1Adv(k) = Pr2Adv(k). Therefore, the
proposed identity-based ZKS satisfies the property of security against adaptively chosen identity attacks.
3 Obviously, A could choose a different D′ such that x ∈ D′ if and only if x ∈ D, and can access the Extract oracle to obtain SID for a new identity ID (a
new corresponding L).A then commits to D′ and could provide a proof π with respect to L for the theorem of ‘‘x ∈ D′ or x /∈ D′ ’’. However, we argue that
the two theorems are indeed different!
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6. Conclusions
In this paper, we first introduced the notion of identity-based trapdoor mercurial commitment and then provided a
concrete construction using the idea of ‘‘Customized Identity’’. Moreover, we used the new notion to construct identity-
based (non-interactive) zero-knowledge sets. We conclude the paper with some discussions as follows.
• More constructions based on various assumptions.We could providemore identity-based trapdoormercurial schemes from
other number theoretic assumptions using the idea of ‘‘Customized Identity’’. Are there efficient constructions fromother
assumptions such as zero-knowledge proof systems or without using the identity-based trapdoor commitments?
• The relation between identity-based trapdoor commitments and identity-based zero-knowledge. Katz et al. [23] provide a
general construction for an identity-based proof system starting from any non-malleable proof system. We could use
an identity-based trapdoor commitment to construct the corresponding trapdoor mercurial commitment and zero-
knowledge sets. On the other hand, it seems that identity-based trapdoor commitments are closely related to multi-
trapdoor commitments [17], which can be used to construct concurrent non-malleable knowledge proofs. Therefore, is
it sufficient to construct identity-based zero-knowledge from identity-based trapdoor commitments?
• Applications for identity-based plainmercurial commitments. As already observed by [11,12], plainmercurial commitments
without the strong equivocation property can be used to design the so-called indistinguishable sets, which have the
same functionality as zero-knowledge sets, but the privacy property is relaxed to only state that for any two sets and any
sequence of inclusion/exclusion assertions which does not separate these sets, seeing the proofs of the corresponding
assertions does not allow one to distinguish between these two sets. Therefore, it is also interesting to construct identity-
based plain mercurial commitment schemes for such suitable applications.
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